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Abstract 
 
Up to now a clear theoretical and methodological framework for economic-environmental analysis of 
environmentally damaging subsidies is lacking. Environmentally damaging subsidies are all kinds of 
direct and indirect subsidies aimed at achieving a certain (often non-environmental) goal that produce 
negative external effects to the natural environment. This article develops a transparent method to 
determine the environmental impact of indirect government subsidies and derive policy lessons. This 
method has been applied to several major subsidies in the Netherlands, namely in agriculture, energy, 
and transport. The results reveal large environmental effects, which need to be taken seriously by 
policy makers. The method enables policy makers to evaluate the environmental impacts of indirect 
government subsidies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg government leaders have re-
confirmed that sustainable development should be a top priority for government policy. However, 
research suggests that many current government policies and public structures are still subsidising an 
unsustainable development. Governments spend hundreds of billions of dollars to subsidise production 
and consumption in resource-intensive sectors like agriculture, transport, energy, water, forestry and 
fisheries (van Beers and de Moor, 2001; OECD, 1998 and 1999). Many of these subsidies especially 
indirect types of support, cause unintended but significant environmental effects. 
As opposed to direct subsidies, which are visible at the expenditure side of the government's 
budget, indirect subsidies often are not recognised as subsidies. They include various types of 
governmental interventions, such as tax exemptions for particular groups, determination of minimum 
prices for agricultural products, and financial guarantees, such as export credit facilities. It is moreover 
quite difficult to determine the environmental consequences of indirect subsidies, both in theory and in 
practice. There is hardly any scientific literature on the analysis of public subsidies, neither in public 
economics nor in environmental economics. Standard theory in public economics analyses subsidies 
often as negative taxes without any specific features assigned to subsidies (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980). Empirical studies of the effects of subsidies assume certain relationships between on the one 
hand changes in relative costs and revenues and on the other hand choices regarding production and 
consumption by the subsidy recipient. These linkages, however, are hidden in implicit assumptions 
and mechanisms in empirical models. 
 This paper reports a policy framework founded in microeconomic theory to determine the 
environmental effects of government subsidies in a transparent and relatively straightforward manner. 
This is based on van Beers et al. (2002). The approach includes a set of transparent models for 
different circumstances and subsidy types. In addition, it covers the assessment of a number of 
environmental effects as well as aggregation and weighting of these into an aggregate environmental 
index. 
 The definition of a subsidy is obviously an important starting point for our analysis. We have used 
a broad definition, namely all government interventions that directly or indirectly keep prices for 
consumers below, or for producers above, market level prices.1 A useful taxonomy of subsidies is as 
follows: 
• Tax subsidies through deductions, exemptions or special tariffs such as reduced energy taxes for 
specific sectors or the low VAT rate on meat. 
• Public provision of goods and services below the cost such as infrastructure or associated services. 
• Capital subsidies such as loan guarantees, debt forgiveness or government loans with lower than 
market interest rates or under soft conditions. 
• Price regulation: policy measures through the market mechanism that shift the cost burden (partly) 
to market players; examples are minimum prices for agricultural products and maximum prices 
through price controls. 
• Quantity restrictions: regulations towards a minimum use of a certain input or product; an example 
is the regulatory rule set by Germany that electricity companies should use a minimum quantity of 
domestically produced coal. 
• Trade barriers: regulation of imports through rules, quotas and export credits. 
 
                                            
1 Although the lack of government policy aimed at internalising external effects is not considered a subsidy here, the policy 
framework is also suitable to analyse and calculate the environmental impact associated with external effects. 
 2
 The organisation of the paper is as follows. In the next section the structure of the policy 
framework is outlined. Section 3 then describes the concrete microeconomic models used to translate 
the policy framework into an operational tool. Section 4 applies the method to, and reports empirical 
results for, three major indirect subsidies in the Netherlands. These relate to the production sectors 
agriculture, energy and transport. A final section presents conclusions. 
 
2. The policy framework 
 
2.1 Policy framework 
 
The policy framework is illustrated by the stepwise procedure depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
determine subsidy type 
 
 
 
determine magnitude of subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
adjust for policy environment 
 determine economic effect
 
 
 
 quantify parameters 
environmental effects
sensitivity analyses
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Policy framework for subsidy assessment 
 
First the type of subsidy is determined to identify the specific model needed for the analysis. This is 
followed by an assessment of the (monetary) magnitude of the subsidy, which can be regarded as a 
rough measure of the magnitude of the economic and environmental disturbance caused by the subsidy 
under consideration. The next steps are formalisation and quantification of the mechanisms that 
determine the economic effects of the different indirect subsidies. The mechanisms differ between 
subsidy types and can include a number of economic variables, including supply, demand, prices, 
input mix and technology type. In a subsequent step, the economic effects are the inputs to the 
calculation of environmental impacts. The end result is a quantitative relationship between the 
magnitude of the subsidy on the one hand, and the generated economic and environmental effects on 
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the other. Note that policy filters may be required to correct for the impacts of other government 
policies if these enhance or compensate the effects of a particular subsidy. One example from our 
study is the combination of quotas and the subsidy type 'guaranteed prices' for milk in the agricultural 
sector. 
The magnitude of a subsidy is determined as the amount of money (prices or cost savings) or as a 
volume of a physical product (functional units or kg). If it is not possible to quantify the subsidy, this 
does not necessarily mean that the analysis of the impacts of such a subsidy will only provide 
qualitative information. An example is a production subsidy that stimulates use of another production 
technique. A comparison of the environmental effects of the different techniques is then still possible. 
From a theoretical perspective, a key factor behind the impact of a subsidy on the economy is the point 
of incidence of the subsidy in the chain of activities and markets. This is illustrated in Figure 2. A 
chain with three activities offers a sufficiently rich framework to analyse both the flows of 
intermediate goods and linkages between economic activities (e.g., activity 1 → 2), and the final 
products going to consumers (e.g., activity 2 → 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3
Market Market
Subsidy 1 Subsidy 3Subsidy 2 Subsidy 4 Subsidy 5
Figure 2. Points of incidence of a subsidy in activities and markets. 
 
The activities are connected through markets, which transmit the impact of the subsidy to other 
economic variables. For example, producer subsidies can affect input- and output prices directly and 
the quantities indirectly. The reaction of the prices and, hence, the effect on the quantities produced are 
incorporated in the price elasticity. The ultimate effect of a subsidy depends partly on the kind of 
competition in the relevant markets. An example is gasoline tax reduction to truck drivers. The fierce 
competition in this sector promotes the transmission of the resulting price reduction to other sectors in 
the production chain. As a result, the economic activity of the transport sector hardly changes. 
Consumer subsidies like VAT-exemptions affect the quantities demanded through the price directly. 
Both an income and price effect then emerge. A tax exemption for commuting traffic, for example, 
increases income and reduces the costs of commuter traffic. All these examples require specific 
models for their analysis. 
 
2.2 Indirect subsidies for producers 
 
On the supply side, the first effect of a subsidy is reflected in the behaviour of the decision-makers in 
companies or within a sector. The main question is what the consequences are for inputs, technology 
and output (scale of production or volume). Technology is seen as being related to the production 
process within a company, particularly the process technology. The inputs that have an effect on the 
environment are energy and raw material resources, including land and water (especially in 
agriculture). A subsidy that affects the cost of using raw and auxiliary materials can stimulate the use 
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of one technique over another. Capital subsidies and R&D subsidies usually allow more freedom in 
terms of choice of techniques, but even they can impose a particular technique – explicitly or 
implicitly – which may have consequences for the environmental pressure per unit of output. 
At a company level it is possible to determine whether a specific subsidy affects the prices of inputs 
or outputs, costs or profit. Some subsidies have a direct effect on the prices of inputs or output, whilst 
others have an indirect effect on prices, for example, through costs or volume restrictions. A subsidy 
on an input will have a relatively small effect on the output if the non-subsidised inputs are essential or 
irreplaceable (i.e. there are no substitutes) and the price elasticity of demand for the end product is 
low, or if the input makes up only a small part of the overall marginal costs. Such a subsidy primarily 
affects profit. Where there is a substitute there will be a shift in the input mix from a non-subsidised to 
the subsidised inputs. Depending on the price elasticity in the demand for the end product and the 
magnitude of the subsidy in terms of its effect on the marginal costs, there can be a significant output 
effect.2 If a subsidy on an input stimulates or imposes the use of a particular input and the effect on the 
prices of the end products of the company concerned is small, then the analysis should focus on the 
relevant factor market. 
 In addition to the substitution possibilities between and within input factors, the economic effect 
also depends on the type of output and input markets. For example, where there is fierce competition 
on the sales market, a capital subsidy via a soft loan or low required return on investments might lead 
to lower output prices, a demand for greater volume and consequently to increased production. It will 
be very difficult to trace or quantify the effect of capital subsidies because it runs through the ‘black 
box’ of investment decisions – where uncertainties, coincidence, subjectivity and dynamic aspects 
dominate. 
 A capital subsidy, or a subsidy on a particular type of capital good, is a subsidy on a company’s 
fixed costs. These subsidies permeate slowly through the sector under consideration. Capital subsidies 
allow much room for manoeuvre as regards the choice of production process, and are therefore not as 
harmful to the environment. Conversely, if these subsidies are abolished the ‘environmental benefits’ 
are not felt until much later. In most cases where these subsidies harm the environment it is because 
they lead to new development work or are given to polluting industries that have a long technical life. 
 In contrast, subsidies on variable costs result in immediate consequences for production decisions. 
Such subsidies (e.g. on energy, equipment or water) immediately discourage the innovation that would 
lead to more economic consumption. This has far-reaching environmental consequences because it is 
precisely the extraction of raw materials and energy and the manufacture of equipment that are among 
the most polluting economic activities. Given that the use of certain raw and auxiliary materials often 
also means that only one or a small number of techniques can be used, subsidies on equipment, energy 
and water easily lead to ‘lock-in effects’. These can be reinforced by subsidies on certain types of 
capital goods. In addition, there is a category of subsidies on fixed costs that have a major 
environmental impact. These are subsidies without which an entire economic activity would not start 
or take place at all. A capital subsidy on new development work in the mining industry is a clear 
example of this. 
 In principle, it is possible to consider that almost all indirect subsidy effects take the form of price 
changes. In this regard the notion of a shadow price is relevant. A ‘shadow price’ is the change in 
costs of production that results from moving, for a given level of production, from a certain input to 
one that is stimulated by an indirect subsidy. In the case of a subsidy through volume regulation on a 
(domestic) input, a producer is forced to use more of this domestically produced input than is 
                                            
2 Sometimes this might even happen within a subset of production factors – take the energy input mix, for example. Such a 
substitution effect can have major environmental consequences, even if the sale of the end product is hardly affected by the 
subsidy. 
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economically efficient. This will make the production costs higher than without the subsidy; the 
difference per unit of output is the ‘shadow price’. Also a tax exemption on an energy-intensive input, 
for example, is the shadow price of that input. However, in the case of a tax exemption that has a 
general effect on profit it is less clear how the economic effect is reflected in the price, especially 
when a company produces several products. In this case the effect depends on competitive 
relationships on the input and output markets. For example, if the output market is very competitive, 
the producer will be quick to reflect the tax exemption in the prices of the end products. 
 A subsidy on the output price immediately affects the proceeds from the product, which has a 
significant impact on both the volume demanded and the volume supplied and thus also on the volume 
of inputs required. 
 Guaranteeing a minimum price, e.g. for primary agricultural products in the EU, gives the producer 
a direct and strong (price) incentive to increase production in order to obtain a maximum profit from 
the subsidy. Minimum prices have far-reaching economic consequences and invite a chain of 
subsidies. One direct consequence is that excess (supply) is created, and that new subsidies are 
required to transport and store this excess, which is then eliminated by selling it to domestic 
consumers or on export markets with yet more subsidies. Furthermore, a system of minimum prices 
can only be maintained if import barriers are raised to keep out cheaper products from foreign 
competition. Ultimately such output price subsidies can even lead to a change in the production 
structure and a ‘lock-in’ of subsidised activities (see below). A minimum price subsidy is often part of 
a more complex policy package, e.g. with volume regulation to avoid excess supply. 
 
2.3 Indirect subsidies for consumers 
 
We now turn to subsidies for consumers, i.e. the demand side. In general, price effects on consumption 
can be assessed by examining market prices, incomes and substitution effects. 
In accordance with market forces, a subsidy in the form of a maximum price has an immediate 
effect on demand. The output price is lower and consumers will therefore increase demand. Subsidies 
via indirect taxes, such as no-VAT-on-airline-tickets or exemption from excise duty on kerosene, are 
also directly reflected in the end prices and therefore have a direct effect on the volume demanded. 
Subsidies running through income taxes affect both income and the shadow price and therefore 
have a strong effect on demand. Tax exemption for a particular activity, such as the former flat rate 
allowance for commuting between home and work, leads not only to a higher net income but also to a 
reduction in the costs of the activity in question. As a result, there is a larger volume of commuter 
traffic. In the specific case of the flat rate allowance for travel costs, the subsidy may stimulate people 
(continuing) to live further away from work, which is a form of ‘lock-in’ of activities with undesirable 
environmental effects. 
Subsidies via income taxes have another indirect effect, namely on the distribution of income. 
Taxes are partly intended to affect the distribution of income, but subsidy measures can undo these 
envisaged effects and contribute to inequality of income. Subsidy measures in progressive tax systems 
in particular can have this effect. An analysis of this effect is, however, beyond the scope of this study. 
 
2.4 The scope of effects of indirect subsidies 
 
It is useful to look at the extent to which subsidies have partial or limited versus significant 
consequences. For example, the interim or ultimate demand for a product may be significantly affected 
as regards magnitude or composition, or the sector structure may change (the ‘technology’ above 
company level). In such cases a partial analysis might not offer enough insight. 
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Some economic effects take time since a lot of changes come about through investments. A 
dynamic breakdown is necessary before aspects such as tax deduction for investment in capital, write-
offs and interest payments can be adequately analysed (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). Gradual 
discarding of obsolete technology, write-offs, future expectations, accumulation of capital, and long-
term environmental effects then give the analysis a dynamic character. 
If anything, the effect of a subsidy that leads to a ‘lock-in’ of activities is even more complex. The 
term ‘lock-in’ indicates that an unwanted or less than optimum technology or method of production 
dominates as a result of a historical process of positive feedback or self-reinforcement (‘path 
dependence’) based on coincidences (‘historical accidents’). The source of the positive feedback is the 
existence of increasing returns to scale, caused by processes on the demand or supply sides of the 
economy.3 Subsidies can influence these returns to scale and thus tip the balance in historical 
development to a ‘lock-in’ of an unwanted method of production. For example, the price subsidies in 
agriculture have led to a gradual shift in the production structure. Specific capital subsidies that are 
accompanied by technological requirements have a stronger lock-in effect than generic capital 
subsidies, which reduce loan costs for example but leave companies free to use the resulting extra 
financial scope as they see fit. Significant lock-in effects also result from sunk costs. For example, if 
the government decides to build a (subsidised) coal-fired power station, this will be around for the 
next 40 or more years. As a result of the accompanying sunk costs it will remain cheaper throughout 
that period to continue to use the station than to transfer to an alternative that is cheaper or less 
environmentally damaging. 
Furthermore, a lock-in makes it very difficult to change the existing situation; modifications require 
not only ‘correct prices’ but also additional policy. Although the lock-in effect is the most important 
long-term consequence of subsidies, it is very difficult to quantify. This is because one would have to 
replay the complex historical changes in technology and sector structure without the presence of 
subsidies. A model able to do this would involve too many unverifiable assumptions. It might perhaps 
be possible to gain some insight in specific cases from a comparison between countries with different 
systems and development patterns. 
 However, this presumes an extensive ceteris paribus clause. A good point of departure may well be 
that quantifying the environmental effects of subsidies without lock-in effects will generally lead to a 
lower bound on the actual environmental effects, since the impact of the lock-in will be to strengthen 
the change caused by the subsidy. The specific environmental effects of the subsidy will in this case be 
greater with than without the lock-in, since the result is an increase in the volume of the product to 
which the environmental effects are related. 
 
2.5 Environmental effects  
 
In order to arrive at an estimate of the environmental effects of subsidies it is first necessary to 
consider the relationship between the economic effects as discussed above on the one hand and the 
relevant environmental effects on the other. The environmental effects can be related to the inputs or 
outputs. Where possible, we will assume a fixed relationship between outputs and environmental 
effects. The environmental effects will be aggregated to form theme indicators.4 The environmental 
effects that are relevant for this study are as follows: 
                                            
3 Examples are network externalities (telecommunication), imitation (fashion), information externalities  (more users 
generate more awareness), mass production (lower production costs) and technological complementarities such as 
infrastructure and sub-technologies (e.g. petrol-driven cars, refineries, filling stations). See also David (1985) and Dosi et al 
(1988). 
4 These indicators are based on the Environmental Performance Indicators (EPI) method. See VNCI (2001). 
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• Enhanced greenhouse effect: we will focus in particular on carbon dioxide (CO2), as this is 
relevant for both energy and transport. For the agricultural sector methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) emissions are also relevant. 
• Acidification: NOx and SO2 emissions are particularly relevant for the energy and transport 
sectors; NH3 emissions are particularly relevant for agriculture. 
• Photochemical creation of ozone: emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and carbon 
monoxide (CO) occur in particular in transport. NOx emissions are also important. 
• Eutrophication: phosphates, nitrates, biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen 
demand (COD). The phosphates and nitrates in particular are relevant in the agricultural sector. 
• Land use: although land use is not an environmental impact indicator, its impact is important in 
the agricultural sector. It also plays a role in discussions about possible indicators for biodiversity. 
 
In choosing the above effects for this study we are focusing on the most important environmental 
problems as indicated in the National Environmental Policy Plan 4 of the Dutch government. The 
decision to limit this study to the effects on the most important environmental themes is motivated 
mainly for practical considerations; more indicators can easily be added in a subsequent study, such as 
depletion of the ozone layer, human and ecological toxicity, soil, water and groundwater pollution, 
noise pollution, odour nuisance, safety, waste, and groundwater pumping (see VNCI, 2001). 
The analysis of the environmental effects translates the economic effects – on inputs or outputs – 
into environmental effects. This is done using various data sources and parameters, including those 
that were available at the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). 
Next, Environmental Performance Indicators (EPIs) of each emission are created by multiplying 
each type of emission (in kg/year) in a particular category – e.g. CO2 in the case of global warming 
potential – with a (unique) weighting factor. The results for all kinds of emissions within each 
category are added together, which produces the EPI for that category. This gives the following 
equation for calculating the environmental impact j if this is based on n(j) separate emission types: 
 
),(),()( )(...,,1 ijfactorweightingijtypeemissionjEPI jni ×∑= =  
 
Note that it is possible, in principle, for the emission of a particular substance to contribute to several 
EPIs to which different weighting factors apply. Appendix II contains an overview of the weighting 
factors used. Finally, a sensitivity analysis will have to be performed in which another interpretation of 
the parameters will give insight into the reliability of the calculated effects. 
 
3. Detailed description of the method 
 
In describing the specific models used to assess the economic and environmental impacts of specific 
subsidies, we will take as a starting point the typology of subsidies as presented in the introduction 
(see also Table 1). This section summarises a set of formal models, presented in non-technical terms, 
to assess the economic and environmental effects of different types of subsidies. This consists of two 
elements. First, a list of factors that together determine the environmental effect(s) of a particular 
subsidy is presented. This suggests which data are required to apply a specific method. Second, a 
formal relationship between the factors (variables) is presented. This indicates how the data have to be 
combined so as to derive the environmental effect(s). It is important to note that the availability of data 
is the main restriction on the decision whether to include more or less factors, and as an implication, to 
use a more or less complicated model structure. Table 1 provides an overview of the determining 
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factors per subsidy type, where in two cases a distinction is made between having all relevant data 
available or not. 
 
Table 1. Factors that determine economic and environmental effects, per subsidy type and according                
to availability of data 
Type of subsidy Relevant data available Certain data unavailable 
1. Subsidy in the form of reduced 
input prices 
• Magnitude of subsidy 
• Parameters of production 
function 
• Magnitude of relevant input 
• Output price and input prices 
• Pollution intensity of 
production 
 
2. Subsidy on inputs in the form 
of tax measures (tax subsidies) 
• Magnitude of subsidy 
• Price reaction in demand 
• Output price reaction in 
supply 
• Input price reaction in supply 
• Pollution intensity of 
production 
 
3. Subsidy on outputs in the form 
of tax measures (tax subsidies) 
3.a. Production 
• Magnitude of subsidy 
• Price reaction in demand 
• Price reaction in supply 
• Pollution intensity of 
production 
3.a. Production 
• Magnitude of subsidy 
• Price reaction in equilibrium 
• Volume 
• Pollution intensity of 
production 
 3.b. Consumption 
• Magnitude of subsidy 
• Demand effect of the subsidy 
• Pollution intensity of 
consumption or production 
of consumed product 
 
4. Public supply below cost price Like case 1  
5. Capital subsidies Formal analysis problematic  
6. Minimum prices • Currently supplied volume 
• Demanded volume at free 
market price 
• Pollution intensity of 
production 
• Currently supplied volume 
• Demanded volume at world 
market price 
• Pollution intensity of 
production 
7. Volume regulation Like case 6  
8a. Import barriers (trade 
measures) 
Like case 7  
8b. Export credit guarantees 
(trade measures) 
Formal analysis problematic  
 
A number of aspects summarised in the Table are presented in somewhat more detail below, and much 
more extensively in Appendix I. Note that all approaches are based on information about marginal 
costs. This is consistent with the fact that all the subsidy types in the table affect the marginal costs of 
production or the marginal utility of consumption of a particular product. If this would not be the case, 
there would be no behavioural effect of a subsidy, and therefore no economic and environmental 
impacts.  
 
1. Subsidy in the form of lower input prices – technology effect is dominant 
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If detailed information about production functions is available, such as with regard to energy and 
agriculture, the environmental effects of subsidies that are applied to the prices of input factors are 
determined by five variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy 
• The parameters of the production function 
• The magnitude of the relevant input 
• The output price and input prices 
• The effect of the relevant inputs and output on environmental indicators. 
 
The equations that play a role here are (2), (3) and (16) to (23) in Appendix I. Sub-methods 2 or 3 
should be used if effects on factor or product markets are relevant. 
 
2. A subsidy on inputs in the form of tax measures – dominant effect of factor market 
In the case of a tax exemption on an input factor in a production process the increased environmental 
impact depends on five variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy 
• The price reaction of demand5 
• The output price reaction of supply 
• The input price reaction of supply 
• The pollution intensity of production. 
 
Equation (41) in Appendix 1 indicates the relationship between these variables. 
 
3. A subsidy on output in the form of tax measures – effect of product market is dominant 
3.a. Production 
A tax exemption on the price of an output has an effect on the environmental impact of production 
through the interaction of four variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy 
• The price reaction of demand 
• The price reaction of supply 
• The pollution intensity of production. 
 
Equation (34) indicates the relationship between these variables. If separate information is not 
available about supply and demand, the effect of the subsidy will depend on the following variables 
(see equation 35): 
• The magnitude of the subsidy 
• The price elasticity of the equilibrium volume 
• The equilibrium volume and price 
• The pollution intensity of production. 
 
3.b. The effect of subsidies on consumer decisions 
The extent to which a subsidy affects the environmental impact depends on the following variables 
(see equation (53) in Appendix I): 
                                            
5 The following is meant by ‘price reaction of demand (supply)’: the absolute change in the demanded (supplied) volume that 
occurs in reaction to a given price change. The following is meant by ‘price elasticity of the equilibrium volume’: the relative 
change in the demanded volume (with respect to the equilibrium state) as a result of a relative price change of 1%. 
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• The magnitude of the subsidy 
• The effect of the subsidy on demand. This effect depends on the assumed functional 
specification of the utility function. It is also possible for a subsidy to produce cross-effects, in 
which case the effects must be added together. However, this will not be that relevant in 
practice since the cross-effects are relatively small compared with the ‘own’ effects; 
• The pollution intensity of consumption or production of the consumed product to which the 
subsidy applies. 
 
4. Public supply below cost price 
This amounts to determining the effect of a reduction in the input price and involves using the 
approach described under point 1 or 2. 
 
5. Capital subsidies 
It is very difficult to quantify the economic effects, and consequently the environmental effects, of 
capital subsidies. This is because these subsidies change the conditions under which companies take 
decisions about investments. The specific expertise and information on such effects may well be 
available in the field of corporate financing, but a more detailed analysis is outside the scope of this 
study. Only in specific cases is it possible to carry out an analysis using a different approach. For 
example, in the case of low return on the government share in an airport the indirect subsidy is in the 
form of low airport taxes, which allows carrying out an analysis using approach 2 (a tax exemption on 
an input). 
 
6. Minimum prices 
The extent to which minimum prices affect the environmental impact depends on the following 
variables (see equation (54) in Appendix I): 
• Supply at a guaranteed price, or supply in the current situation. 
• Supply at the free market price. This requires a hypothetical situation, which, in some cases, 
can be based on the application of simple rules such as price change multiplied by elasticity, 
or on earlier studies (e.g. with CGE models). Note that if the world market price is not equal to 
the domestic free market price, then the supply at the world market price is relevant. It is very 
difficult to determine the free market price if there is no world market price or when a 
hypothetical national free market price applies. 
• The pollution intensity of production. 
 
7. Volume regulation 
Since volume regulation and minimum prices usually go together, the method as described under 
point 6 can be used here. 
 
8. Trade measures 
8a. Import barriers 
The same applies here as under 7 since import barriers are a special type of volume regulation. 
 
8b. Export credit guarantees 
Export credit guarantees are a type of subsidy the effects of which are very difficult to quantify. As 
under 5, it is a question of the effect on behaviour in an uncertain situation. It is difficult to determine 
result in terms of polluting emissions.  
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Finally, if the specific environmental effects of a subsidy are determined for a certain subsidy case, 
then the final step is to aggregate and weight these according to the approach presented in Section 2.5. 
 
4. Empirical application and results of the methods in the policy framework 
 
The method of the previous section has been applied to a variety of indirect subsidies within the 
sectors agriculture, energy production, and transport (van Beers et al., 2002). In making a selection of 
cases, a balanced distribution was aimed for in terms of subsidy types, subsidy size, the expected 
impact on producing and consuming activities, and the expected environmental impact of the 
additional activity induced by the subsidy. We illustrate our approach by considering the following 
three subsidies: 
 
• Agriculture: minimum prices for milk. These are EU-policies but we are interested in their 
environmental effects in the Netherlands. 
• Energy: lower regulatory energy taxes for mass consumers as compared with small energy users. 
• Transport: exemption of the Dutch part of excises on airline fuels. 
 
The results in Table 2 show that substantial environmental effects result from each of these subsidies. 
This is particularly true for the subsidies with a point of incidence early in the production chain 
(Figure 2), namely the price support for milk and the tax exemption on kerosene. 
 
Table 2. Environmental effects of indirect subsidies in the Netherlands 
Type of 
subsidy 
Subsidy in € 
bln 
greenhouse gases 
(kton CO2-eq.) 
acidification 
(ton SO2-eq.) 
Photoch. 
Ozone 
(ton ethyl. 
eq.) 
Eutrofication 
(ton phosphate 
eq.) 
Land use (1000 
ha.) 
Price support 
milka 
1400 761–2925b 8400–32,100b 100–500b 7100–27,200b 115 – 215b 
Tax break for 
major energy 
users 
1568 811–2391b 197–566b Na na Na 
Tax exemption 
on kerosene 
1200 1272 2433 208 695 Na 
Notes: 
a. Price support milk has been computed as the effect of a minimum price excluding the effects of Dutch milk quota.  
Including the quota would reduce the environmental effects. 
b.  For price support milk and tax break major energy users the ranges of outcomes under several variants are presented. 
na = not applicable 
 
Price support for milk 
The minimum price for milk increases revenues for farmers directly and is characterised as an output 
subsidy (subsidy 4 in Figure 2). Producers receiving a minimum price increase their supply. In 
response, consumers reduce the quantity demanded so that a surplus results. To reduce this surplus, a 
system of EU milk quota has been introduced in the 1980s. We have corrected for the production 
limiting effect of the quota (see "adjust for policy environment" in Figure 1) by estimating the impact 
of the subsidy in a situation without quota. Our calculations show that the minimum price of milk 
increases the production of milk in the Netherlands by two million tons. Equation (1) demonstrates 
that the total environmental effect is determined by the additional production and the pollution 
intensity of milk production (equation (54) in Appendix I).  
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(1) ∆z = (qsg – qe) Zq 
 
with: 
∆z = the environmental impact 
qsg = (unrestricted) supply 
qe = supply at the equilibrium price in an unregulated market 
Zq = the pollution intensity of production 
 
By means of a range of dairy supply elasticities of 0.26 to 1.00 (Boots et.al, 1997) a higher world 
market price is translated in a higher value of qe. The EU is a major supplier of dairy products at the 
world market. The additional milk production that the EU produces as a result of the minimum price 
subsidy on milk significantly increases the world market supply and reduces the world market price. 
Several variants have been calculated with different combinations for world market prices (ranging 
from € 0.19 to € 0.24) and resulting in different values for qe in order to take into account uncertainties 
with regard to these variables. The contribution to greenhouse gases ranges from more than 0.7 to 
nearly 3 megaton CO2-equivalents.6 The effects on photochemical ozone, eutrofication and land use 
are also substantial. 
 
Tax break for energy 
 
The subsidy on energy use consists of a low rate for major energy users and a special low rate for 
horticulture (compared to the standard rates for small firms and households). This subsidy concerns a 
producer subsidy in the final market (subsidy 4 in Figure 2). The impact runs through the product 
market. Given a production function including taxes and subsidies, the magnitude of the subsidy, the 
price elasticity of the equilibrium quantity and the pollution intensity of the production determine the 
environmental effect of a profit maximising producer, as reflected by equation 2 (see also equation 
(35) in Appendix I). 
 
(2) ∆z = Zq ep* ∆s 
 
with: 
∆z = the environmental impact 
∆s = the magnitude of the subsidy 
ep* = the price elasticity of the equilibrium quantity 
Zq = the pollution intensity of production 
 
The parameters have been quantified on the basis of available studies and official data sources. Several 
variants have been calculated using different values for elasticities and for different energy tax rates, to 
examine the sensitivity of the procedure. The environmental effects range between 0.8 and 2.4 
megaton CO2-equivalents and between 197 and 566 ton SO2-equivalents.  
 
An excise exemption on kerosene 
The exemption from excise duties on kerosene for airplanes (Dutch part) is a producer input subsidy 
through taxes (subsidy 2 in Figure 2). The method involves an equation (3) in which the 
environmental effect is related to five variables: magnitude of the input subsidy, price reaction of 
                                            
6 To compare: the Dutch effort to achieve the Kyoto targets is about 40 megaton CO2-equivalents. 
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demand for air traffic, output price reaction of supply of air traffic, and the input price reaction of 
supply i.e. the impact of the kerosene price on air traffic supply (see equation (41) in Appendix I).7 
 
(3) *p wq
p p
D S
z Z
S D
 ∆ = ∆  − 
s
                                           
 
with: 
∆z = the environmental impact 
∆s = the magnitude of the subsidy 
Dp = price reaction of demand (for air travel) 
Sp = output price reaction of supply 
Sw* = input price reaction of supply 
Zq = the pollution intensity of production 
 
The results show that the exemption leads to an increase of annual passenger kilometres by plane 
equal to 10 billion kilometres. This is 20 % of the total number of annual passenger kilometres. The 
environmental effects in the central variant are 1.3 megaton CO2-equivalents and 2.4 kiloton SO2-
equivalents (cf. Table 2). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The results show that the method has a number of advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages 
are that it is based on traditional microeconomics and it’s straightforward application to realize an 
initial assessment of first-order (economic and) environmental effects. In addition, the method is 
transparent in the sense that the influence of changes in parameter values can directly be traced, 
making sensitivity analysis easy. This allows the method to be useful for policy analysis, both ex ante 
(preparation) and ex post (evaluation). More complex, multisectoral (e.g., CGE) models can be used if 
it is suspected that indirect effects are significant, and may even exceed first-order effects. 
A number of subsidies in the agricultural, energy and transport sectors have been analyzed to 
illustrate and test the method. These sectors contain subsidies that are suspected to have very distortive 
effects on the economy and to create sizeable environmental effects. For agriculture, the 
environmental effects of minimum prices for milk/dairy were calculated. In the energy sector, the 
relatively low energy tax for large-scale energy consumers was examined. In the transport sector, the 
exemption from the Dutch part of the excise taxes on aviation fuels was analyzed. 
The applications show that sizable indirect subsidies can bring about relatively large environmental 
impacts (as summarized in Table 2). This is particularly true for the subsidies provided through the 
energy tax and milk price support. These subsidies interfere at an early stage in the production-
consumption chain, allowing the impact to make it felt strongly and in a prolonged way. The excise 
tax exemption for aviation fuels also has a substantial environmental impact. In all cases the values of 
the elasticities of demand play an important role. 
More research is needed to determine the parameter values accurately and within plausible 
boundaries. From this perspective it can be recommended to establish a database with subsidies and 
 
7 As there were no specific data on the price reactions of demand and supply, we have assumed that empirical price 
elasticities already incorporate the interaction between demand and supply. Additionally, we assume that the kerosene 
subsidy directly affects the output price by the share of fuel costs in total costs (α).The equation then becomes: 
 
*q p
qz Z e
w
α− ∆s∆ =  
with ep as the price elasticity of demand, q as the total activity and w* as the (subsidised) price of kerosene. 
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price elasticities that can be easily and fairly quickly applied for use in the policy process. It is 
recommended that policy priorities given to the removal of subsidies be assigned according to the 
position of these subsidies in the production chain and according as well as to the magnitude of the 
related price elasticities of demand and supply. 
Finally, path-dependence and lock-in factors may be sensitive to the context created by subsidies. 
Since lock-in is related to self-reinforcing phenomena, estimates of economic and environmental 
effects of subsidies generated by the method presented in this paper will often generate lower bounds 
to the actual magnitudes of these effects. 
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Appendix I. Modelling the economic effect of subsidies 
Three approaches to studying the environmental impact of indirect subsidies are proposed in this 
appendix. The approaches differ with regard to the economic information that is required to make the 
model operational. However, we will first present a simple model of the chain from subsidy to 
environmental impact to establish the framework of the analysis. 
 
A basic model of the chain from subsidy to environmental impact 
The following model of the chain from indirect subsidy to environmental effects shows the elements 
and relationships in the chain that have to be determined before the environmental effects of subsidies 
can be calculated. 
 
Q = F(P(s), T(s), D(s)) (1) 
Sij = Hij(I(s), T(s), Q, D(s))  for relevant values of i,j (2) 
Mi = ∑jwijSij    for relevant values of i (3) 
 
The symbols are defined as follows: 
s = a subsidy or collection of subsidies 
P = vector of production factors or inputs 
I = infrastructure 
T = technology 
D = demand 
Q = output 
Sij = environmental impact of effect j of general category i, 
Mi = general environmental impact 
F, G, Hij = functions 
wij = weighting factor for environmental effects (∑jwij = 1) 
 
The first equation gives a relationship between indirect subsidies and demand, using as an example a 
subsidy (or collection of subsidies) that directly affects production factors, technology, and output or 
production level. The second equation is used to calculate specific environmental effects, such as CO2 
emissions, based on inputs, technology or output, or a combination of these three elements. The last 
equation uses weighting factors to aggregate the individual environmental effects and form general 
categories of environmental effects, such as the greenhouse effect (global warming potential). This last 
approach is in line with the EPI method as discussed in section 2.5. 
A general model of the effect of subsidies on producers’ decisions 
Here a model is formulated of the effect of subsidies on the behaviour of producers, based on neo-
classic microeconomic theory. This model is an extension of the basic model – optimisation of profit 
given a production function that describes a relationship between inputs and output – with taxes and 
subsidies. This extended model can be used to study certain changes that are caused by subsidies. Not 
all effects, however, can be traced with this model. For example, the effects of technological choices 
within companies, as well as the effects on a higher scale (such as sector structure, volume and 
composition of demand) are outside the framework of this model. 
The company maximizes profit W 
 
W = (1-tw)[(p+sp)Q – C –v + db] + v + dv (4) 
 
given production costs C 
 
C = (pK-sK)K + pLL + (pI-sI)I + (pE-sE)E (5) 
 
and given the production relationship 
 
Q = F(K,L,I,E) (6) 
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The symbols are defined as follows: 
W = profit 
C = total costs 
Q = output 
K = capital 
L = labour 
I = infrastructure 
E = energy 
p = output price 
pK = capital price 
pL = price of labour (wages) 
pI = price of infrastructure 
pE = price of energy 
tw = proportional tax on profit 
 
The possible subsidies are: 
Q ≤ Qmax  volume regulation on output; 
p ≥ pmin   price guarantee on output; 
I = I*, and pI = 0 public supply below cost price; 
sp = subsidy on the selling price; 
sK = subsidy on capital; 
sI = subsidy on infrastructure (public provision of goods below cost price); 
sE = subsidy on energy (e.g. exemption from Regulatory Energy Tax); 
v = tax-free allowance; 
dv = tax-free direct subsidy; 
db = direct subsidy for taxes (taxable). 
 
Subsidy types (a) and (b) lead to extra conditions in the company’s optimisation problem. The ideal 
way to determine the effect of these indirect subsidies would be to compare the relevant results of the 
optimisation problem (output or input, depending on the point of application of the environmental 
effects) with and without the extra condition in question. Since this is not possible in practice, a rough 
estimate of the effect will have to suffice in order to arrive at quantitative statements. 
Rewriting (4) and (5) gives an insight into effective prices: 
 
W = p*Q – pK*K – pL*L – pI*I – pE*E+ [tw-sw)]v + (1-tw+sw)db + dv (7) 
 
where: 
 
p* = (1-tw+sw)(p+sp) (8) 
pK* = (1-tw+sw)(pK-sK) (9) 
pL* = (1-tw+sw)pL (10) 
pI* = (1-tw+sw)(pI-sI) (12) 
 
represent the effective prices, i.e. the prices after taxes and subsidies. 
Since in (7) the terms that include v, db and dv do not contain Q, K, L, I or E, it follows 
immediately that the corporate decisions that focus on increasing or decreasing the supplied output 
volume or the volume of demand for an input are not affected by a tax-free allowance, nor by direct 
general subsidies. This is because these subsidies do not occur in the marginal rules that follow from 
the first order conditions for the optimisation problem. Obviously such indirect subsidies affect the 
level of profit. 
The decisions about the demand for inputs and supply of output can then be derived from the 
optimisation problem as a function of the various subsidies. This provides the basis for the economic 
model. The first order conditions for the optimisation problem are: 
 
δF/δx = (px-sx)/(p+sp)  for x = K,L,I,E (13) 
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If we specify the production function as a Cobb-Douglas relationship AKakLalIaiEae, and define 
B as B=ak+al+ai+ae, then we obtain the following (output) supply and (input) demand functions: 
 
Q = [A(p+sp)B(pK-sK)-akpL-al(pI-sI)-ai(pE-sE)-aeakakalalaiaiaeae]1/(1-B) (14) 
K = Q1/Bak/(pK-sK)[pLal(pI-sI)ai(pE-sE)ae/(Aalalaiaiaeae)]1/B (15) 
 
with the analogous results for L, I and E. 
A number of insights follow. Note first of all that effects on output and input depend on 
interactions between subsidies, given that there are different subsidies on the right-hand side in (14) 
and (15). It also follows from (14) and (15) that the supply (or output or volume of production) and the 
demand for inputs are not affected by a reduction in the proportional tax on profit (sw). This tax does 
of course affect the level of profit. 
Calculating the partial derivatives from the right-hand side in (14) to the various subsidies 
gives the marginal effects of subsidies on supply. 
 
δQ/δsp = BQ/[(p+sp)(1-B)] (16) 
δQ/δsK = akQ/[(pK-sK)(1-B)] (17) 
δQ/δsI = aiQ/[(pI-sI)(1-B)] (18) 
δQ/δsE = aEQ/[(pE-sE)(1-B)] (19) 
 
As expected, all effects in (16) to (19) are positive (assuming for inputs that the subsidy level 
is below the market price). The expressions also offer the possibility of calculating the magnitude of 
the effects, if the necessary data is available. 
Calculating the partial derivatives from the right-hand side in (15) to the various subsidies 
gives the marginal effects of subsidies on the demand for inputs: 
 
δK/δsp = K/[(p+sp)(1-B)] (20) 
δK/δsK = akK/[(pK-sK)B(1-B)] + K/(pK-sK) (21) 
δK/δsI = -aiK/[(pI-sI)B(1-B)] – (ai/B) (pI-sI)(ai-B)/B[pLal(pE-sE)ae/(Aalalaiaiaeae)]1/B (22) 
δK/δsE = -aEK/[(pE-sE)B(1-B)] – (ae/B) (pE-sE)(ae-B)/B[pLal(pI-sI)ai/(Aalalaiaiaeae)]1/B (23) 
 
with the analogous calculations for the derivatives of I and E (and also L if it can be directly linked to 
environmental effects, which is not obvious). The signs of the effects in (20) and (21) are positive, 
which is as expected. The signs in (22) and (23) are negative, which is also as expected because price 
cross-effects are negative in normal practice with inputs that can be substituted (as is assumed with the 
choice of the Cobb-Douglas production function). 
It is now possible to determine the extent of the effect of the subsidy. This depends on five 
variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy (sj for j = p, K, I or E). 
• The production function parameters (A; aj for j = k, l, i or e; and B). 
• The magnitude of the relevant input (Q, K, or I). 
• The output price and the input prices (p and pj for j = p, K, I or E). 
• The effect of the relevant inputs and output on the environmental impact (see equation (2)). 
 
Tax-free allowance for the output price (low rate of VAT for consumers) 
If no information is available about the production function, then an analysis can immediately start at 
the level of demand and supply functions. This is the point of departure of the following two 
approaches. They are based on interaction between final demand and supply of a particular product, 
which introduces demand effects in the analysis. Partial equilibrium analyses show the effects of an 
indirect subsidy, such as a tax-free allowance, on prices and volumes of output and input. The prices 
are determined by the interaction between demand and supply. Two types of tax-free allowances are 
considered, namely on the output price and on the input price. 
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We start by defining demand and supply functions in equations 24 and 25:8 
 
qd = D(p*,pi,y) (24) 
 
We assume that a tax-free allowance – i.e. an indirect subsidy s – applies for the product in question, 
so that p*=p-s, where p is the price to which the subsidy is applied. The following also applies: 
Dp*<0; Dy>0; Dpi<0 (complementary goods), or Dpi>0 (substitutes). 
 
qs = S (p, wi) (25) 
 
where: 
.0;0 <>
iwp
SS  
 
The symbols are defined as follows: 
q = equilibrium volume; 
qd = volume of demand; 
qs = volume of supply; 
p = price of the product to be subsidised; 
s = subsidy in the form of a low rate of VAT; 
p* = effective price of the product (including subsidy); 
pI = prices of other complementary or substitutable products; 
y = aggregated income of the consumers; 
w = input price. 
 
The equilibrium condition is: 
 
q = qd = qs (26) 
 
which is equivalent to: 
 
D (p – s, pi, y) = S (p, wi) (27) 
 
In order to find the effect on the equilibrium price, the equilibrium volume and the external effect, the 
total differential of (27) is determined: 
 
0)(* =−−−++− iwspyipp dwSdsSdpSdyDdpDdsdpD ii  (28) 
 
The subsidy has an effect on the equilibrium price and the equilibrium volume. We can therefore 
suppose that dpi = dy = dwi = 0, which leads to: 
 
Dp*(dp – ds) – Sp dp = 0 (29) 
 
It then follows that: 
 
pp
p
SD
D
ds
dp
−= *
* . 
(30) 
 
Here we are mainly interested in the effect of the subsidy on the equilibrium volume since that is the 
point of application for environmental effects in this model. This effect can be determined as follows: 
 
                                            
8 Demand and supply curves are derived from maximum-utility consumer behaviour and profit-maximising producer 
behaviour. Functions with a sub-index indicate a first derivative to the variable in the index. 
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Note that the sign here is positive. This means that a higher subsidy (lower VAT) stimulates 
consumption and thereby production of the product in question. 
We next assume a positive dependence of an environmental effect z on the produced 
equilibrium volume, so that: 
 
z = Z(q) (32) 
 
where: 
Zq > 0. 
 
From (31) and (32) it can be derived that the environmental effect of the subsidy is equal to: 
 
pp
pp
q SD
SD
Z
ds
dq
dq
dz
ds
dz
−== *
* . 
(33) 
 
The effect in (33) is a marginal effect that can be considered the average effect for relatively small 
changes. In other words, if the magnitude of the subsidy is ∆s, then the environmental effect is equal 
to: 
 
s
SD
SD
Zz
pp
pp
q ∆−=∆ *
* . 
(34) 
 
The sign here is positive, i.e. the effect of the subsidy (a low rate of VAT) on the environmental 
impact of production is positive. The extent of this strengthening effect of the subsidy depends on four 
variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy; 
• The price reaction in the demand (Dp*); 
• The price reaction in the supply (Sp); 
• The pollution intensity of production (Zq). 
 
The second variable in this list depends on the type of product (e.g. necessity or luxury) and on 
consumers' preferences. The third element reflects the production costs of the company (or sector), and 
indirectly also substitution possibilities in the input mix, availability of alternative production 
techniques, and the competitive situation on the sales market. 
Note that (34) can also be expressed in terms of price elasticities of demand and supply. Most 
price elasticities already include the interaction between demand and supply. In this case a more 
simple equation can be used: 
 
spqeZz pq ∆=∆ *)/*( * . (35) 
 
where ep is the price elasticity of the equilibrium volume. The extent of this strengthening effect of the 
subsidy depends on four variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy; 
• The price elasticity of the equilibrium volume (ep*); 
• The equilibrium volume and price (q* and p*); 
• The degree of pollution from production (Zq). 
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Tax-free allowance for the input price 
The point of departure is different if we want to study the environmental effect of a price on 
production inputs or factors. If we start immediately with the equilibrium condition, then a subsidy s 
on the input price w leads to: 
 
D(p, pi, y) = S (p, w*). (36) 
 
where w* = w – s. From the total differential and logical price changes it then follows that: 
 
Dpdp – Spdp – Sw*ds = 0. (37) 
 
Which can be rewritten as: 
 
pp
w
DS
S
ds
dp
−−=
* . (38)
 
The effect of the subsidy on the equilibrium volume is then: 
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The environmental effect changes as follows: 
 

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If the magnitude of the subsidy is equal to ∆s, then the environmental effect is equal to: 
 
s
DS
SD
Zz
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q ∆



−=∆
* . (41)
 
The sign here is positive. In other words, a given change in a tax-free allowance for an input factor to a 
polluting production process results in greater environmental damage. The extent of that damage 
depends on five variables: 
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• The magnitude of the subsidy; 
• The price reaction in the demand (Dp); 
• The output price reaction in the supply (Sp); 
• The input price reaction in the supply (Sw*); 
• The pollution intensity of production (Zq). 
 
Finally, note that it is assumed that the market price w of the input is not affected by the subsidy. If it 
were affected, then a more complicated expression than (41) would result and more information would 
obviously be needed for the calculations. 
 
Effect of subsidies on consumer decisions 
A model is presented here that reflects the effect of subsidies on consumer decisions. Consumer 
subsidies are to be expected in particular in the transport sector. Think of the flat-rate allowance for 
travel costs or the exemption from VAT on airline tickets, for example. As with the model for 
producers’ decisions, we will first consider the general problem and then a specific example using 
functional specifications of the utility function. 
The consumer maximizes utility subject to the parameter condition of his budget. In general 
terms, the utility function can be expressed as follows: 
 
U = U(x1,…., xk,….., xn) (42) 
 
The budget restriction is as follows: 
 
iiiy xsp
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fyt )(
1
))(1( −
=
Σ=−−  
(43) 
 
where: 
U = utility; 
y = income; 
ty = income tax; 
f = subsidy via a flat-rate allowance; 
xi = consumption of product i (i = 1,….,n); 
pi = price of product i; 
si = price subsidy on product i; 
 
Working out this maximisation problem yields the following demand functions: 
 
),,,,.....,,....,( 11 ynnkkii tfyspspspDx −−−=  (44) 
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(45) 
 
Let us suppose that not all goods are subject to a subsidy: si = 1 for i = k and si = 0 for i ≠ k. In the case 
of substitution between the goods the following applies: 
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In the case of complementary goods the following applies: 
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We will work this out by specifying a Cobb-Douglas production function for 2 products, e.g. public 
transport (x1) and subsidised private use of cars (x2). The utility function is: 
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This function is maximised under the parameter condition of the budget restriction: 
 
22211 )())(1( xspxpfyty −+=−−  (49) 
 
Solving this system gives the demand functions for x1 and x2: 
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Differentiating to s2 only affects the demand for the ‘own’ product, x2. A larger subsidy leads to a 
larger demand for the product on which the subsidy is given, as is shown by the following partial 
derivative: 
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Differentiating to the flat-rate allowance f affects the demand for both products: 
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The Cobb-Douglas specification implies that the cross-elasticities are 0. In transport, for example, low 
values for such elasticities can be substantiated based on the fact that the transfer from private to 
public transport is difficult due to lock-in effects. 
The connection with the environmental impact is made via equation (2) in Appendix I: 
 
qki Zsxsz δδ /∆=∆ . (53) 
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The extent to which tax affects the environmental depends on the following variables: 
• The magnitude of the subsidy (∆s); 
• The effect of the subsidy on demand (δxi/δsk). This effect depends on the assumed functional 
specification of the utility function. Here there is a choice between various equations. It is also 
possible for a subsidy to produce cross-effects. In that case the effects should be added 
together. However, in practice this is of limited relevance since the cross-effects are relatively 
small compared to the ‘own’ effects. 
• The degree of pollution from use or production of the consumed product to which the subsidy 
applies (Zq). 
 
Minimum prices 
As shown in Figure I.1, a producer reacts to a minimum price pg > pe (= market equilibrium price) by 
producing more and offering more of the product for sale than the equilibrium volume (qe). Consumers 
on the other hand reduce the volume of demand for the product because the price is higher. This 
creates a surplus that is accompanied by an extra subsidy transfer compared with the situation where qe 
is offered for sale at price pg. The total subsidy transfer is cdpgpe. 
The environmental effect of the price guarantee is expressed as follows: 
 
qeg
s Zqqz )( −=∆  (54) 
 
The volume effect (first part of the term on the right-hand side) can be derived from Figure I.1. The 
following information is required to apply this equation: 
• Supply with price guarantee, i.e. in the current situation (qsg); 
• Supply at free market price (qe). This requires hypothetical data, which in some cases can be 
based on earlier studies (e.g. with CGE models). Note that if the applicable world market price 
(pw) is not equal to the domestic free market price (pe), the supplied volume qe in the equation 
should be replaced by qw; 
• The degree of pollution from production (Zq). 
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Figure I.1. The economic effect of minimum prices. 
 
Legend: 
qi = volume of the product (volume of supply or demand); 
pi = price of the product; 
D = demand curve; 
S = supply curve (marginal private costs). 
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Appendix II Weighting factors used to calculate environmental indicators 
 
Table II.1 contains the weighting factors that are used to calculate environmental indicators. These 
factors are based on VNCI (2001). 
 
Table II.1. Weighting factors for calculating environmental indicators 
 Greenhouse effect Acidification Photochemical 
ozone creation 
Eutrophication
CO2 1    
N2O 310    
CH4 21  0.006  
NOx (as NO2)  0.41 0.028 0.13 
SO2  1   
NH3  1.30  0.35 
VOC   0.5*  
CO   0.027  
Phosphate    1 
Nitrate    0.1 
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